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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the Order of the District Court for
Salt Lake County, Judge Pat B. Brian, upholding the Final Order
of the Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director
of the Department of Business Regulation suispending all secondary
trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc. stock.

Jurisdiction is

vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuadt to §78-2a-3(2)(a)
Utah Code 1977-1988, as an appeal from a District Court review of
a final order of a state agency.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented by this appeal ai?e:
1.

Whether the statute prohibiting s^les of securities

without registration with the Utah Securities Division (&61-1-7
Utah Code 1987-1988) also prohibits gifts.

That is, is a "gift"

a "sale" within the meaning of said statute?
2.

Whether the gifts of stock in Amehity, Inc. made by

appellant were made in good faith or bad f^ith.
3.

Whether the respondents properly applied their statutory

authority in issuing the Final Order.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE:

§61-1-7 Utafr Code 1987-1988

"It is unlawful for any person to offfer or sell any securi-ty
in this state unless it is registered undelr this chapter or the
security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from District Court

review of administrative agency action.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On June 5,

1986/ the Utah Securities Division (the "Division") brought an
action before itself pursuant to §61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act (the "Act") to revoke all trading exemptions of
Amenity, Inc. under said §61-1-14 (R. 73,74).

Said petition

alleged in substance that appellant had made a distribution of
Amenity, Inc. stock in violation of §61-1-7, quoted above, and
that such was done tor the purpose of evading the registration
requirements of the Act (R. 73,74).
The matter was set for hearing on June 19, 1986, (R. 75) at
which time it was agreed between the parties that the facts were
not in dispute and that the matter would be submitted on legal
briefs on the following stipulated facts (R

, see footnote 1,

following page):
1. Amenity, Inc. ("the company") was incorporated on
January 7, 1986, with capitalization of 100,000,000 shares
of $0,001 par value.
2. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares were issued
to appellant Capital General Corporation ("CGC") for a
consideration of $2,000.00 cash. As of that date, CGC was
the only shareholder of the company.
3. CGC is a financial consulting firm, incorporated
in 1971, and has numerous contacts, customers, former
customers, business associates, etc. in the financial
world.
4. CGC gave 100 shares each out of its 1,000,000
shares of the company's stock to approximately 90U of such
-3-

c o n t a c t s , c u s t o m e r s , e t c . Persons or e n t i t i e s who
r e c e i v e d t h e g i f t s were s e l e c t e d a t random and i n c l u d e d
s h a r e h o l d e r s of such c o n t a c t s , c u s t o m e r s , e t c . and p e r s o n s
who formerly had no d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t with CGC.
No r e g i s t r a t i o n s t a t e m e n t for t h e g i f t q d s h a r e s was f i l e d .
5. Although a prime reason for making t h e g i f t s was
t h e rewarding of p a s t a s s o c i a t i o n and l o y a l t y and t h e
g e n e r a l exposure of CGC's f i n a n c i a l c o n s u l t i n g b u s i n e s s t o
p e r s o n s in t h e f i n a n c i a l world, o r , in o t h e r words, t h e
c r e a t i o n a n d / o r maintenance of g o o d w i l l , no c o n s i d e r a t i o n
or payment of any kind for t h e s t o c k was s o l i c i t e d or
a c c e p t e d . That i s , i t was s t r i c t l y a f r e e and bona f i a e
g i f t , no s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d . The r e c i p i e n t s did not have t o
buy a n y t h i n g , become a customer of CGC| f i l l out a
q u e s t i o n n a i r e or pay or p r o v i d e any c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t a l l ,
and they were f r e e t o r e j e c t the g i f t s if they d e s i r e d .
At s a i d h e a r i n g on June 19, 1986

i t was s t i p u l a t e d t h a t

the

i s s u e s in the case were s o l e l y i s s u e s of law and r e l a t e d t o now
t h e above quoted §61-1-7 and r e l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s of the Act

i

The respondents recorded the two subsequent hearings referred to below,
but they failed to record the f i r s t hearing on June 19, 1986, at which the
stipulation was made and the stipulated facts were received in written form.
Appellant discovered only two days before i t s brief was due that portions of
the record below occurring after said nonrecorded hearing, but establishing
said stipulation, have been omitted by the Clerk of the District Court,
presumably inadvertantly. Rather than seek a continuance to allow time to
rectify the problem, i t was decided to write this footnote of explanation
inasmuch as appellant does not believe respondents will deny their stipulation
in their brief. This is because (1) to do so would 1throw yet another error in
the proceedings below inasmuch as i t was respondents responsibility to record
the hearing, and appellant has relied on said stipulation in subsequent hearings, (2) respondents have not denied the stipulation in any of the several
proceedings and filings since said hearing, and (3)1 i t appears from respondents arguments below that they yet feel entitled to have the judgment below
affirmed as a mattter of law based on the stipulated facts, either alone or
with additional facts subsequent to said hearing. Should appellants belief be
in error, i.e. should respondents deny having entered into the stipulation on
June 19, 1986, appellant will request the Clerk of ! the District Court to
certify the missing portions of the record and will supplement this brief to
provide the appropriate references to the record.
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applied to the above facts.

The parties submitted briefs and the

matter was set down for further argument in September 1986, and
in October 1986 the administrative law judge, Honorable J. Steven
Ecklund, issued his findings and conclusions and recommended
order (included in addendum) that the petition of respondents1 be
denied and dismissed "there being no proper basis to conclude
that the registration requirements mandated by Section 61-1-7 are
applicable to the disposition of the securities in question."
(R. 31).
Respondent regulatory agencies were naturally disappointed
in Judge Ecklund's recommended order dismissing their petition
and therefore caused further review of said order and further
factual hearing before the Utah Securities Advisory Board on
January 20, 1987, (R. 25) at which time they were successful in
persuading their advisory board to overrule Judge Ecklund and
find and conclude and rule that the gifts of stock by appellant
violated §61-1-7.

Based thereon, respondents issued the Final

Order of suspension (R. 16-20).
Thereafter, appellant filed a petition with the District
Court for Salt Lake County seeking a review of said Final Order
(R. 2-8). The District Court having upheld said Final Order,
appellant has appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Facts.

As of the date of respondent's petition, June 5,

1986, and the hearing thereon, June 19, 1986, the above stipulated facts constituted all of the facts of the case.

-5-

Subsequent

to said date, appellant conducted further activity with respect
to Amenity, Inc., including the rendering of assistance for a fee
(R. 118, page 57) in causing an infusion of assets into (R. 118,
page 19), and the acquisition of control of,t the corporation by
third parties.

Appellant does not believe facts developed

subsequent to the said June 1986 petition and hearing are inconsistent with or change the legal effect of the above stipulated
facts (see footnote 2 on page 18) and therefore will not itemize
them further at this time.

Undoubtedly respondents will

emphasize in their brief those facts they teel are most
important, but essentially the facts are not in dispute.

What is

in dispute is the conclusions of respondents in the Final Order
with respect to the facts.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Distirct Court summarily and without listing any findings or reasons for its ruling, upheld the Final Order of the
respondents1 suspending all secondary trading exemptions (R. 107,
108).

Appellant believes that the District Court's said order

should be reversed because it is contrary to the statutes and
unsupported by the evidence adduced in the administrative
hearings.

This can be summarized in three main areas, any one of

which is sufficient to require reversal of, the order, as follows:

-6-

1.

"Gift" v, "Sale,"

The plain meaning of tne statute

(§61-1-7 Utah Code 1987-1988) clearly limits its application only
to sales.

Appellant acknowledges that it did not register the

shares ot stock that it gave away, but the wording of the
statute, both by the plain meaning and import of the terms used
(it uses "sale" and "sell," not "give" or "gift"), and the
purposes of the securities laws (to protect people who pay money
or other consideration for securities) is clearly against the
interpretation placed on it by the respondents.
It is appellant's position that because the Act, and in
particular the section quoted above, is limited by its terms to
situations involving sales, the Division and the Act have no
power or application whatsoever relating to the giving of the
gifts by appellant.

Therefore respondents' order suspending

trading of the gifted shares based upon the alleged wrongful act
in the giving of the shares must be set aside and reversed as a
matter of law.
Appellant acknowledges that once the shares have been gifted
that the Act would apply to subsequent transfers of such shares,
i.e., that any subsequent trades would have to comply with the
provisions of the Act and the respondents' rules with respect to
secondary trading.

However, respondents' petition and order is

not brought or based on violation of the secondary trading rules,
but is founded solely on respondents' allegations that the gifts

-7-

were in violation of the statutory prohibition against sales of
unregistered stock.

Since there were no sales, the order should

be reversed.
2.

Bad Faith vs. Good Faith Gifts.

Even if tne term "sale"

does include the term "gift/1 §61-1-1 3( 1 5) (cl) ( i) specifically
exempts a good faith gift.

It would seem obvious that any gift,

a good faith gift or a bad faith gift, is still a gift, i.e., not
a sale and therefore not covered by the Act.

Whether or not

there is even such a thing as a bad faith gift is open to question (it is not mentioned or defined in the, Act and it is otherwise unfamiliar terminology).

But if it is assumed for a minute

as argued by respondents that a bad faith gift is a sale, the
Order entered below should nevertheless be overruled because, in
fact, the gifts made by appellant were good faith gifts.

This is

shown in that a) the original stipulated facts when it was agreed
to submit the matter solely on a question of law state that the
gifts were "bona fide gifts," b) the administrative law judge's
findings and conclusion state that the gifts were made in good
faith (R. 31), and c) the facts adduced at the final hearing
subsequent to the administrative law judge's findings and conclusions, held January 20, 1987, again shofv clearly that Capital
General Corporation took every reasonable step to comply with the
law and acted in good faith in every way (R. 11b).
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3.

Respondents Exceeded Their Authority,

exceeded their statutory authority in any event.
authority is contained in §61-1-14(3).

Respondents have
Respondents1

This section grants

respondents the authority to revoke secondary trading exemptions
granted by statute only if the the person seeking the exemption
has failed to come within the statutorily defined criteria for
the exemption.

It does not grant authority to revoke exemptions

which have not been claimed, nor does it allow revocation based
on grounds outside of said §14.

Respondents1 petition and order

violate both of these statutory limitations on their authority.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

RESPONDENTS1 FINAL ORDER AND THE ORDER OF THE
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE ON THE GROUND
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW §7 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT APPLIES ONLY TO SALES OF SECURITIES
AND NOT TO GIFTS OF SECURITIES.

Section 7 is quoted above on page 2.

Simply stated, it is

appellant's position that since the legislature limited the
application of the statute to situations involving the selling of
securities, the action of respondent regulatory agencies in
applying it to the giving of securities is gross error.
The matter is so simple, it would seem it would require no
argument.

Everyone surely has been aware ever since grammar
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school that "sale" and "gift" do not mean th|e same thing, but
connote totally different concepts.

These words are practically

as common in usage and understanding as "ye£" and "no."

Even so,

the legislature defined "sell" or "sale" in the Act (§61-1-13
(15)(a)) as a disposition "for value," which, as one would
predict for such a commonly used and understood word, is
identical to the dictionary definition and the common accepted
usage.

Although "gift" is not defined in the statute it is no

less well understood.
That words used in statutes are to be bonstrued according to
their plain meaning is likewise such a simple and universally
established principle as to require no argument.

Nevertheless, a

few citations follow:
Section 68-3-11 Utah Code 1987-1988:
Words and phrases are to be constjrued according to
the context and approved usage of the language; but
technical words and phrases, and such others as have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or
are defined by statute, are to be construed according
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
"Sell" is not a peculiar or technical word, and the definition in
the statute is totally consistent with the plain meaning and
approved usage in the language.
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967) at 451:
The statute should not be stricken down nor
applied other than in accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes some
basic constitutional right. If it meets these tests it
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is not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom,
or its effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or
orderliness of the procedure set forth, but it has a
duty to let it operate as the legislature has provided.
There is nothing about the word "sell" which is unclear,
confused, inoperable, beyond reason, etc.

On the contrary, it is

totally clear and fits totally within the scheme and purpose of
securities regulation, i.e., to protect purchasers of stock.
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of New York, 3 59
N.E.2d 1338 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976) at 1341:
Hence, where as here the statute describes the
particular situations in which it is to apply, "an
irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is
omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or
excluded." (McKinney's Constitutional Laws of N.Y.,
Book 1, Statutes, §240).
Had the Utah Legislature intended the prohibition respecting
sales of securities in §7 to also apply to gifts of securities,
it would have been an easy thing for the legislature to have
included gifts as well as sales in the wording of the statute.
However, having described "the particular situation in which it
is to apply," i.e. sales, an irrefutable inference must be drawn
that it was intended to omit gifts.
Finger Lakes Racing Association v. New York State Racing,
382 N.E.2d 1131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) at 1135:
Courts are constitutionally bound to give effect to the
expressed will of the Legislature and the plain and
obvious meaning of the statute is always preferred to
any curious, narrow or hidden sense that nothing but a
strained interpretation of legislative intent would
discern (Citations).
-1 1-

It is an elementary principle of [statutory construction that courts may only look behind the words of
a statute when the law itself is doubtful or ambiguous
(Citations), If, as here, the terms of a statute are
plain and within the scope of legislative power, it
declares itself and there is nothing left for interpretation. To permit a court to say that the law must
mean something different than the common import of its
language would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of government and practically invest it
with lawmaking power.
Appellant would add to the above and say that to permit the
respondents to say that §7 of the Act mean^ something different
than the common import of its language would make the respondent
regulatory agencies superior to the legislature; and that surely
it is obvious that what respondents have done is "nothing but a
strained interpretation of the legislative intent..." in issuing
their Final Order in this matter.
There are hundreds of precedents all over the country which
have held similar to the above authorities^ and it serves no purpose to burden this brief with dozens more appellate court citations to the same obvious effect.

Inasmuch as the District Court

failed to list any findings, conclusions ot reasons for its
ruling upholding the respondents1 Final Order, appellant does not
know why the District Court did not adopt ^hese well known
doctrines of statutory construction.

However, the record at the

agency level indicates that the rationale for the Final Order is
to the effect that appellant's gifts to approximately 900 donees,
which admittedly were gifts from the standpoint of the donee
(i.e. they were not asked to, nor did they|, give any value for
-12-

the stock they received) , were not gifts from the standpoint of
appellant because appellant obtained some value from having made
the gifts, e.g., valuable goodwill and cash for services in
connection with ongoing activities of the company.
In a nutshell, it appears the claim of respondents is that
appellant's "gifts" are in fact "sales" because of the profit,
potential or actual, which has or may become available to
appellant from having made the gifts.

No doubt this line of

reasoning is deemed advisable because of the obvious difficulty
in getting around appellant's plain meaning arguments ana
irrefutable authorities cited above.

However, appellant

respectfully submits that it just won't work.

Such line of

reasoning is still totally inconsistent with the well established
plain meaning doctrine and the above cited authorities and is
merely a play on words in an attempt to get around the said
authorities without having to challenge their obvious
correctness.

Consider the following simple illustration:

Labeling a chicken a duck does not make it so, even though
both are birds and one can point out many similarities between
them, such as size, feathers, walk, etc.

In the same way, both

gifts and sales are transfers of property and there are many
similarities between them, as for example, in Doth cases the
transferor receives something from having made the transfer.

In

the case of a gift the transferor may receive goodwill, perhaps

-13-

greater loyalty from the giftee, an opportunity for profitable
business in the future, or just a good feeling, etc.

There is no

such thing as a gift that does not provide Something for the
giver.

The obvious reason that a sale is different is that a

sale connotes a bargain, i.e., a contractually agreed upon
consideration.

This is the common and accepted usage and is

identical to the definition in the Act.

Section 61-1-13(15)(a)

provides:
"Sale or "sell" includes every contract for sale of,
contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or
interest in a security for value. (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding respondents' apparent willingness to call a
chicken a duck, appellant respectfully submits that no reasonable
mind can seriously contend that under the jj>lain meaning ana
common usage of the words gift and sale, the gifts of Amenity
stock were sales to purchasers rather than gifts to donees.
Pointing out, as respondents have done, th&t as of the date of
the gifts and respondents1 petition alleging them to be unlawful
there was hope for ongoing profit from other sources and activities and that subsequently a portion of such hope became a
reality, does not change the nature of the| gift transactions.
There is still no bargain, no contract, no purchase, no disposition for value, and the recipients of the |stock are still donees
of gifts, and to hold otherwise would be a violation of the above
well established and documented plain meaning doctrines just as
clearly as if it were held that "sell" means "give."
-14-

Notwithstanding the obviously correct principles and
authorities cited above, suprisingly enough there have been other
enterprising litigants who have contended for the strained interpretation respondents would seek to establish.

But without

exception, every time anyone has tried it they have been overruled and their twisted interpretation of the statute disallowed.
For example, in two Federal cases, Truncale v. Blumberg, 80
F.Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) and Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140
(2nd Cir. 1949), cert, den., 37 U.S. 907, it was sought to
include gifts in the definition of sales under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Similar arguments were used as in the

present case, i.e., that the persons making the gifts had
received some benefit from having done so, such as goodwill,
loyalty of their executives, etc.

These arguments were rejected

by the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, and
they refused to consider the gifts made in those cases as sales
within the meaning of §16(b) of said 1934 Act for the same
reasons stated above by appellant, that is, those courts
emphasized the natural and plain meaning of the words gift and
sale and saLd that "to sell or otherwise dispose of" as used in
the statute could not be inferred to include a gift, Truncale v.
Blumberg, supra at 39 0.
For an additional Federal point of view and that the Securities and Exchange Commission has issued statements consistent
with the above principles, see Greater Jersey Bankcorp., (Sept.

-15-

29, 1980) CCH 76,718.

This was a "no action letter" of the

S.E.C. involving a situation where a company proposed to give to
approximately 50 to 75 persons per year for an indefinite number
of years, approximately $50 worth of stock each.

These shares

were to be given to employees who maintained perfect attendance
for a year.

The S.E.C. stated that such gi£ts did not come

within the purview of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933
requiring registration of sales.

It is significant to note that

those giftees had to actually do something to earn the gifts
(perfect attendance) whereas in the present case there are no
strings attached to the gifts whatsoever,

plearly there was a

benefit to the employer in making the gifts,, but this did not
make them sales.
It is not necessary to look to other jurisdictions to see
the fate of those arguments that have sought to convince appellate courts that gifts are sales or that receipt of some benfit
changes a gift to a sale.

The Utah Suprem^ Court considered the

precise issue of this case in Andrews v. Cfyase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah
1935).

This case is so precisely in point that a quote from the

opinion could be substituted for some of the paragraphs in
appellant's brief as though it had been written solely for that
purpose.

At page 941:

The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of
securities which are exempt from the Provisions of the
Securities Act. Appellant does not contend otherwise.
What he does contend is that the Act merely regulates the
-16-

sale of securities and has no application whatever to
securities which are given away. It will be observed that
"sale or sell" is defined as every disposition, or attempt
to dispose, of a security or interest in a security for
value. The words "for value" are descriptive of, and
constitute a limitation on, the kind of transactions which
the Securities Act was intended to regulate. It is a
cardinal rule of the construction of a statute that, when
possible, effect must be given to all the language used in
the Act. If the legislature had intended the words "sale
or sell" should include "gift or give," it would not have
limited the former words to such disposals, or attempted
disposals of securities as are made for value.... Had the
lawmaking power intended that the Act should apply to
gifts of securities, it would have been a simple matter to
have so provided.
It is to be noted that although the Securities Act referred
to in the above case is not the identical securities act as is
presently in use, the key provisions and definitions are the
same.

It is also significant to note that as in the present

case, the company that gave the gifts of stock to the public did
so with the hope of receiving some benefit (an even more direct
benefit than in the present case in that it hoped to receive
assessments on the stock directly from the persons whom the stock
was given to). In rejecting the argument of respondent and
ruling in favor of appellant in that case, the Utah Supreme Court
relied on the same reasoning stated above in this brief, i.e.,
the plain meaning of the words and that it was not a sale or
attempted sale because there was no contractual agreement that
the giftees would pay the levied assessments (even though many
did pay them voluntarily).

At page 942:
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A mere hope or a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t t h e t t a n s f e r e e s of t h e
s t o c k would pay t h e a s s e s s m e n t , i t and when l e v i e d , may
not be s a i d t o be a d i s p o s i t i o n or an a t t e m p t t o d i s p o s e
of t h e s t o c k for v a l u e w i t h i n the meaning of t h e Act. A
g i f t does not become a s a l e merely because t h e donor hopes
t o r e c e i v e something for the g i f t .
In t h e p r e s e n t case t h e g i f t s of C a p i t a l General were given to
m a i n t a i n and e s t a b l i s h goodwill and p r o v i d e an ongoing v e h i c l e
for p o t e n t i a l f u t u r e b u s i n e s s with r e s p e c t t o Amenity,
which in f a c t o c c u r r e d .

Inc.,

L i k e w i s e , many of t h e g i f t e e s of

stock

in t h e Andrews c a s e p a i d t h e a s s e s s m e n t s as was t h e hope and
2
a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h o s e g i v e r s of s t o c k .
Bu|t t h a t d i d n ' t
t r a n s f o r m t h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s t o c k froml g i f t s t o s a l e s , and
the wording of t h e Utah Supreme Court, " . . . h a d t h e lawmaking
power i n t e n d e d t h e Act should apply t o g i f t s of s e c u r i t i e s ,

it

would have been a simple m a t t e r t o have so p r o v i d e d " i s s t i l l

the

l a s t word on t h e s u b j e c t and s t i l l t h e i n e s c a p a b l y l o g i c a l and
correct

conclusion.

2
I t is noteworthy that althougn many of the donees paid the assessments,
the Supreme Court in i t s ruling in the above quoted material from page 942
mentions only the hope of receiving i t and not the Subsequent actuality of
receiving i t . This is significant because i t clearly shows that the Utah
Supreme Court correctly looked at the gift transactions as of the time they
were made, i . e . , if they were gifts at the time they were made the character
of them does not change depending upon whether, or the extent to which, the
hope of the giver subsequently materializes.
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In discussing this Point I, appellant has cited several
precedents and authorities, and there are many more to the same
effect.

On the other hand, after approximately a year and a half

since the first briefs were filed on the question, with subsequent hearings and further briefs, respondents have yet to locate
a single case in any jurisdiction construing any securities law
where gifts of securities have been held to constitute sales.

In

attempting to do such in the proceedings below, respondents have
cited the Federal "spin-off" cases, chief among which is S .E.C.
v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
However, notwithstanding dicta in those cases to the effect that
for a transfer to be a sale the purchase price or value need not
flow directly from the recipient of the stock, it is obvious in
reading those cases that they do not involve gifts in any sense
of the word.

The recipients of stock in those cases were not

giftees, but they received the "spin-off" stock as a result of
contractual obligations and contractual rights to receive it,
that is, they had purchased stock previously which legally
entitled them to a prorata share of the subsequently distributed
stock.
That neither the legislature nor the respondents (prior to
this case) ever intended §7 to apply to gifts is clear by the
conspicuous absence of any reference to such, not only in the
Act, but in the respondents1 own regulations and procedures for
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registering securities.

This is, the respondents' own regula-

tions apply only to sales, and there are no procedures or regulations established for the registering of £fifts. Appellant's
attempts to obtain a response from the respondents to this
obvious defect in their arguments have been totally unsatisfactory.

One such response has been that all of the same

requirements for registration of sales of security would apply to
gifts and that the same procedure would be used (R. 118, page
69).

It would unduly burden this brief to go into a detailed

analysis of each of the requirements for registration as adopted
by the respondents pursuant to the Act to ^how that they all
contemplate sales and none contemplate gifts, but just one
example here will be sufficient to establish the error in
respondents' arguments:
The respondents' rules place certain \imitations on stock
dilution following the sales of stock to the public.

For

example, if one pays a dollar for a share of stock, but immediately after the sale of stock to the public that share is only
worth 50<j? because of being diluted with otljier outstanding stock
of less value, then the value of the public stock has been
reduced by 50% immediately upon sale.

The respondents' dilution

formulas limit the amount of such devaluation that is allowed in
sales of stock to the public, and they have argued that its
dilution formulas would apply to petitioner's gifts.
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But this

cannot be done (because the stock can't be devalued below zero,
the price of the stock to the giftees), and to suggest that it
could or should is ridiculous.

Clearly, respondents1 own rules

promulgated under the Act as well as the clear purpose of the
legislature in enacting §7 is to prevent people from losing their
money by purchasing securities about which they do not have
sufficient information.

In the present case, the donees of the

stock have paid nothing, and so there is nothing to lose and
nothing to regulate, i.e., they are not in the class needing
protection since they made no "investment decision."
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, at 127 (1953).

S.E.C. v.

This is a very

glaring fact that the respondents have consistently chosen to
ignore.

POINT II.

RESPONDENTS1 CONCLUSION IN THEIR FINAL ORDER THAT
APPELLANT'S GIFTS WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH IS
UNTRUE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

At the outset of this discussion of Point II, appellant
would strenuously urge that the question, raised by respondents,
of the good faith or bad faith nature of the gifts is not a
proper question for consideration.

This is because the authori-

ties and principles cited under Point I, above, exclude all gifts
from the operation of §7 of the Act, and so it is pointless to
discuss what type of gift it was.
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To hold otherwise would be to

read into the statute wording that is not there, i.e., the
statute would read that one must register both sales and bad
faith gifts.
That such was not the intent of the legislature is clear,
not only from the plain wording of the statute which limits the
operation of the statute to sales for value^ but also from the
fact that nowhere in the Act is the term "b£d faith gift" even
mentioned, let alone defined.

Surely, if the legislature is

going to proscribe conduct, it must follow the fundamental rule,
"that restraints or duties imposed by law must be clear and
unequivocal."

(Basin Flying Service v. PubfLic Service

Commission, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975) at pafge 1305).

To allow

respondents to read into the statute that a bad faith gift is a
sale within the meaning of §7 is no less a violation of the
established principles and authorities cited under Point I than
calling any other non-sale for value transaction a sale. Though
"bad faith gift" may have a negative connotation, and there may
therefore be reasons independent of the Act that one may wish to
avoid being accused of it, the simple fact remains that it is not
defined, no one really knows what it means lor has even heard of
it before respondents brought it up in thi^ case, and for sure §7
doesn't say anything about it, let alone ptohibit it.
Nevertheless, since respondents have relied heavily on this
fiction in the proceedings below, appellants will discuss it
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briefly.

This has been necessitated by the fact that notwith-

standing the stipulated facts at the initial hearing that the
gifts were bona fide gifts, and notwithstanding the administrative law judge's finding some months later that the gifts were
made in good faith, respondents thereafter required further
hearing on the specific issue of whether the gifts were made in
good faith or bad faith, and they thereafter concluded that the
gifts were made in bad faith.

Although appellant has strenuously

urged that such was not a proper question to be determined by
respondents, appellant would even more strenuously urge that to
the extent good or bad faith may be in issue, there certainly has
never been any bad faith on the part of appellant, and that
respondents1 conclusion to the contrary, which was upheld by the
District Court, has no basis in fact or evidence in the record or
otherwise.
Respondents have emphasized in the proceedings below that
§61-1-14.5 of the Act places on appellant the burden of proving
its gifts were made in good faith.

Said section says, in sub-

stance, that a person claiming the facts fit within an exception
from a definition has the burden of so proving.

Although good

faith gifts are specifically excepted under §61-1-13(15)(d)(i) ,
it does not follow that appellant must prove its gifts come
within said exception.

On the contrary, respondents must show

that appellant's conduct fits within the prohibition of the
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statute, i.e., that appellant sold securities, before any other
provisions of the Act, including any exceptions to definitions,
penalties, or any regulatory power of the respondents at all,
come into play.

And that they cannot do (s^e Point I, above).

Nevertheless, assuming for a moment that it is necessary to
determine whether or not appellant acted in good faith in making
the gifts of stock, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the
proposition that the gifts were in fact mad^ in good faith.
Facts in the record establishing the gifts to have been made
in good faith are as follows:
1. The stipulated facts are that the gifts were bona
fide gifts (page 4, above).
2. The administrative law judge (concluded that the
gifts were made in good faith (R. 31).
3. No government witness or any [other person
testified that the gifts were made in bad
!
faith.
4. It is undisputed that no recilpient of the gifts
was required to pay anything, do anythl ing or provide any
consideration (or even accept the gifts).
5. Testimony indicated a bona filde and good faith
intent on the part of appellant to benefit the various
donees (R. 118, pages 24, 25, 31).
6. Testimony also showed that in furtherance of
appellant's good faith intent to benefit the giftees of
stock, it took further action with respect to the
development of Amenity, Inc. into a viable
jfabl< business, thus
enhancing the value of the gifts (R. 118,
j18, page 19).
7. The testimony was undisputed that appellant had
no intent to violate §7 requiring registration of sales of
stock, would have been happy to register the gift shares
had it believed the statute required Registering of gifted
shares, etc. (R. 118, pages 9, 11, 17f 23, 38, 63).
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In summary, if the above isn't sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof that the gifts were made in good faith, appellant
would ask, "How else does one prove good faith?"

The absence of

any evidence of bad faith ought to be sufficient in itself.
Nevertheless, the Department of Business Regulation, through
its Securities Advisory Board and Executive Director, concluded
that the gifts were made in bad faith (R. 12). In Point I,
above, it is pointed out that respondents have not been able to
produce a single case supporting their strained interpretation of
the statute.

Similarly, under this Point II, they cannot point

to even one shred of evidence in the record that appellant is
guilty of bad faith.

Nevertheless, the structure of respondents1

Final Order is internally logical in that it states as a finding
of fact, in substance, that appellant's gifts of stock were done
with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the registration
requirements of §7, (R. 11) and then it concludes from said
finding that having such intent amounts to bad faith (R. 12).
That would be logical and make good sense if there weren't two
very glaring and terminal problems, as follows:
1.

There is not any evidence in the record that the gifts

were made with an intent to avoid the registration requirements
of §7. On the contrary, the evidence shows that appellant
investigated the registration requirements with the intend to
comply with whatever they might be (R. 118, pages 9, 11, 17, 23,
38, 63).
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2.

It is categorically impossible for anyone to circumvent

the provisions of any statute when the statute does not prohibit
the conduct in question.

In this case, sin<be §7 of the Act does

not require the registration of gifts of securities, how can one
circumvent the Act by giving unregistered securities?

It is

about as logical as saying that one who has deliberately stayed
within the speed limit to avoid a citation (Ls guilty anyway
because he has circumvented the statutory requirement that he be
subject to the imposition of fine for exceeding the speed limit.
Perhaps it would frustrate any governmental purpose there might
be to fill its coffers by the collection of speeding fines - but
have we really gone that far?
Every day businesses and others review statutory requirements on myriads of subjects and purposely keep their activities
out of the scope of the regulations in ord^r to avoid the expense
and inconvenience in dealing and complying with them.
that bad faith?

Of course it isn't.

How is

In other words, what is a

desire to make a gift (not regulated by statute) instead of a
sale (regulated by statute) in order to avoid being regulated by
the statute have to do with the question of good or bad faith?
This rhetorical question is asked only to illustrate the error in
respondents' thinking, but it does not represent the facts of the
present case inasmuch as appellant has beein willing to register
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the stock if required (R. 17). But even if appellant deliberately chose gifts instead of sales because it didn't want to deal
with the registration requirements of §7, it does not establish
bad faith - only that it stayed within the speed limit.
The bottom line is this:

Respondents have not been given

regulatory authority over the gifting of stock, but they want it
and appear to be willing to call a chicken a duck (see Point I,
above) and make unsupported findings (discussed above) to accomplish it.

Et is clear that respondents are arguing backwards in

an attempt to accomplish their goal, that is, they would seek to
establish the proposition that the lack of registration of the
gifted stock is in and of itself sufficient to establish intent
to circumvent, with consequent bad faith, etc., i.e., that such
lack of registration is the only fact of importance, and from
such it can be presumed that there was an intent to violate the
statute requiring registration.

That makes sense, of course,

only if the statute really does require registration of gifts.
Since it doesn't (see Point I ) , said argument of respondents' can
avail them nothing, and the record remains without any evidence
of intent to circumvent or bad faith, and the only evidence is of

J

See the bottom of page 68 and top of page 69 of the transcript of the
January 20, 1987 hearing, (R. 118) where counsel for respondents in his
closing argument basically admits that the testimony supports good faith
intent, but asks that the Securities Advisory Panel look behind the testimony
to what actually happened, i.e., no registration, to establish the real intent
of appellant.
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good faith and intent to comply with the law.

To hold otherwise

would render it impossible to give away unregistered stock in
good faith because no matter how good one's intentions may be, he
would always be stopped by that unalterable fact that the stock
is unregistered.

Obviously the specific sebtions of the statute

in question and the Act as a whole could not possibly have contemplated such an incongruity or unjust reslult.
In a nutshell, it would appear that respondents' bad faith
argument is just another attempt to circumvent and frustrate the
plain meaning and wording of §7 quoted on page 3, above.
they say gifts are sales.

First

Then we're told that if gifts normally

are not sales, certainly appellant's gifts were since they
intended to obtain some benefit.

These arguments being irrefut-

ably disposed of above under Point I, we aife now told that bad
faith gifts are sales. No one knows what ^ bad faith gift is,
but fortunately respondents come to the front and tell us that a
bad faith gift is one that is unregistered (notwithstanding the
evidence shows good faith).

So in this way we find out that

anything not registered is a sale, and so in effect respondents
have extended the definition of sales to include gifts contrary
to the plain meaning of §7 and the many authorities cited above
in Point I.

All of these erroneous, circuitous and lifting by

one's own boot strap type arguments of respondents are rooted in
the failure of respondents to fully comprehend that 1) the
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statute allows them to regulate sales only, and 2) the fact that
a giver of gifts receives some benefit from having done it does
not somehow change those gifts into sales, cast doubt on the good
faith nature of them, or show any purpose to circumvent or
frustrate laws not applicable to gifts.
Although the reasons the respondents might have for wanting
to regulate gifts are not necessarily material to this appeal,
since motives have been discussed, it might be pertinent for
appellant to indicate that it believes that not only has the
legislature failed to allow respondents to regulate the gifting
of stock, but there are no valid reasons that respondents should
be allowed to.

This is mentioned here because in all of the

furor and excitement in the arguments and briefs of the respsondents, one may get the impression that someone has been hurt or
lost money or made a complaint, etc. with respect to the
activities of Capital General Corporation in its stock gifting
program, or in other words, that maybe "policy reasons" demand a
closer look at the possibility of adopting respondents1 strained
interpretations of the statutes than would seem to be indicated
by the numerous authorities cited above to the contrary.
In view of the substantial efforts and determination on the
part of the respondents to put a stop to the gifts, one might
expect to find some very insidious and very damaging results to
be evident at this time, approximately two years after the gifts
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were made.

Yet none of this is the case, and no such things have

even been alleged or claimed by anybody to the best of
appellant's knowledge.

That is, respondents have failed anywhere

in their arguments or factual presentations to point out any
examples of losses or even potential losses to anybody.

They

have pointed out in the hearing below that some secondary sales
in Amenity stock have occurred which might not have been in conformity with secondary trading regulations, but they have not
shown that if such sales were out of compliance how anyone has
been hurt, or how the respondents would have been able to prevent
it if the gifts had been registered under §7.
The point is that if in fact secondary trading regulations
are being violated in sales by giftees, the situation would be no
different than if a company that registered sales of securities
(i.e., complied with §7) failed to comply with the secondary
l

trading laws thereafter.

Such an issue relates to compliance or

noncompliance with laws which are applicable only after the
original stock distribution, and not as part of it.

And if

respondents really believed there were violations of such laws in
connection with subsequent sales of the gifted stock, it could
easily have brought their petition to stop the violations based
on such laws (and they could still do so with respect to this
company, even now) - no one questions their authority to do
that.

In other words, if there are such violations, respondents
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have their remedy already in place, and therefore it is wholly
unwarranted for them to bring this action under §7 (which,
requires a judicial rewriting of the statute and changing its
plain meaning).
In summary, not only have the respondents wholly failed in
the proceedings below to establish that the gifting program of
appellant comes within the purview of its regulatory powers, but
they have not established any advantage to anyone that such be
the case.

There is no statutory or other authority for

respondents to take the action they did, and there is no public
benefit from such either.

POINT III.

RESPONDENTS1 FINAL ORDER AND THE ORDER OF THE
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS A MATTER
OF LAW FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENTS EXCEEDED
THEIR STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

Respondents have exceeded their statutory authority in any
event.

Respondents1 authority is contained in ^61-1-14(3).

Appellant's concern with respect to said authority is that said
section fails to list any criteria upon which the action of
respondents in issuing suspension orders, such as the one issued
in this case, are to be based.

In considering the entire Section

14 as a whole on the subject of exemptions, and Suosection (3),
in particular, on respondents1 authority to revoke exemptions,
two things are apparent.
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a.

That at least some criteria for exercising the

authority is implied by Subsection (3), or otherwise there would
be no need for a hearing (i.e. it does not Appear the legislature
intended to grant respondents the authority to revoke statutorily
granted exemptions solely upon their whim oi the moment), and
b.

That, though not specifically mentioned in Subsec-

tion (3), the authority to revoke exemption^ is based on the
factual question of whether or not the particular exemption
sought to be revoked is applicable, i.e. authority is granted to
revoke an exemption when it is determined by respondents after
opportunity for a hearing that the facts don't fit the claimed
exemption.
Respondents seem to agree with a. in that they held the
hearing and listed grounds, but they apparently disagree with b.
in that the grounds they listed were appellant's alleged violation of §7 in making the gifts without registration.

Appellant

asks, "Where does it say that?"
In other words, respondents have exceeded their authority
because nowhere in §14 or in Subsection (3)1 of §14 or elsewhere
is there any statement that exemptions which may otherwise be
valid under §14 would be rendered invalid because some other
prior transaction on the same company violated §7.
To be even more specific, suppose for the sake of argument
that John Doe, giftee, received his gift of 100 shares of stock
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in Amenity, Inc. in a gift transaction that was in violation of
§7.

A year later, or 10 years later or at any time, he wants to

sell the shares based on one of the exemptions described in §14,
for example, Subsection (2)(a), the isolated transaction exemption, i.e., John Doe wants to sell it to his brother in a private
transaction.

Here's the point:

the acquisition or the gift in

the first place, perhaps years prior, is a totally separate
transaction from the subsequent private sale.

It is therefore

very apparent that Subsection (3), though failing to list
specific criteria within the subsection itself, contemplates the
criteria listed in the rest of §14, in this illustration, whether
or not the sale proposed by John Doe to his brother was in fact
an isolated transaction that complied with Subsection (2)(a).
There is no basis in the wording of said Subsection (3) to add to
that criteria the question of whether John Doe had acquired the
shares in a transaction that had not been registered in violation
of §7.
That this is so and can be put to rest forever is shown by
the fact that under §7 it is lawful to sell securities on an
either/or basis, i.e., if they are either registered o_£ exempt
under §14.

In other words, it is contemplated exclusively that

the exemptions described in §14 apply only to unregistered
stock.

Yet respondents are saying the fact the stock is unregis-

tered in this case is the reason the §14 exemptions don't apply just the opposite of what the statute says!
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The fact is undisputed that on June 5, 1986, when the
respondents filed their petition seeking suspension of all §14
exemptions, neither John Doe nor any other giftee had sought or
claimed any §14 exemptions.

4

Only the first} transaction, i.e.,

the gifts, had taken place, and so it can b^ seen that what the
respondents are attempting to do is forever dispose of any possibility that any giftee might come within any of the §14 exemptions and be able to sell their stock.

Appellant believes that

such is totally unwarranted by the language of the statutes.

On

the contrary, instead of allowing a blanket suspension of all
exemptions, the statute clearly contemplated only that each
potential exemption should be considered on its own merits, i.e.,
whether it fits the statutory description of the exemption at
such time as a particular person or group of persons may seek it
in selling their stock.
Regardless of other considerations, ldgically, it would
appear that there are only two possible ways of interpreting said
Subsection (3): The first one would be that respondents are
allowed to revoke exemptions without any grounds or upon grounds
or reasons of their own choosing.

However * if the legislature

4
Nor have they since said date, to the best of appellant's knowledge,
although subsequent to said date there have been sdme trades perhaps on the
assumption that certain §14 exemptions are applicable.
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wanted to grant them that much authority there would have been no
need to require a hearing.

The second possible interpretation

would be that exemptions can be revoked only upon the grounds
stated in the other portions of the section, i.e., Subsection (3)
establishes respondents as watchdog as to whether or not specific
transactions, e.g. in the example given above, the isolated sale
transaction, really comply with the statutory description of
such.
This latter view is the one that makes sense.

It doesn't

make any sense that the legislature would describe by statute
particular fact situations that are exempt, require an opportunity for a hearing if revocation is sought by respondents, and
then allow respondents to revoke the exemptions at their pleasure
or on other grounds totally outside of the statutory description.

Yet, that is exactly what respondents1 Final Order has

done, and if it is upheld, there is no way to remedy it for any
of the stockholders, not now or 50 years from now, because it is
a final order based on a fact alleged and existing on the date
respondents' petition was filed, June 5, 1986 (i.e. the gifts
having been made without registration), which fact is history and
cannot change.
That the arguments of appellant are correct is seen not only
from the plain wording of the sections of the Act discussed
above, but also from §§20 and 21. These sections plainly and
clearly provide respondents with several specific alternative and
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cumulative remedies for violations of §7, if any there be in the
facts of this case.

These remedies include rescission, fines,

disgorgement of profits, injunctions, and even criminal penalties.

As has been shown under Points I and II above, there has

been no violations of §7, but certainly it is obvious from the
statutory provisions themselves that if there had been, it is
totally improper for respondents to claim any remedies under
§14(3) which would necessitate a total departure from the statutory provisions.

There can be no question but that the legisla-

ture intended violations of §14 (i.e. claimed exemptions that do
not fit the statutory descriptions) to be brought under §14(3)
and violations of §7 to be brought under §§20 and 21, and that
therefore respondents having exceeded their authority under
§14(3), their Final Order based thereon should be overruled.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to set
aside and reverse the Order of the District Court and tne Final
Order of respondent regulatory agencies as a matter of law and/or
on the basis that it is not supported in the record below.
Clearly, the fact that Capital General has made numerous gifts of
stock and expects to gain something by it does not change the
character of the gifts so that they are sales within the meaning
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of §7 of the Act.

The hold otherwise would violate the plain

meaning of the English language, numerous authorities cited
above, the statutory definition of "sale" and long established
rules of statutory interpretation including those which require
that if the government is going to prohibit something, it must
define it and spell it out in plain English.
In the three points discussed above, appellant has
established that:
1.

The section of the Act relied on by respondents, §7,

requiring registration of sales of securities, has no application
to appellant's gifts of stock.

Since the orders entered below

are based upon the opposite proposition, they must be reversed as
a matter of law.
2.

Even if §7 were to have been violated by appellant, the

orders entered below must be reversed as a matter of law because
the Act does not allow respondents to issue orders revoking
exemptions based on a violation of §7 but provides for different
exclusive remedies under §§20 and 21.
3.

The issue of good or bad faith is not a proper issue for

determination, but is brought up by respondents in an attempt to
circumvent the plain meaning of said §7.

But if it were a proper

issue, appellant has met its burden of establishing its gifts
were made in good faith without any intent to violate said §7.
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In summary, the respondents, who are state agencies, brought
an action and held hearings (basically before themselves) and
after three tries finally got the result they wanted, although it
required making unsupported findings and cqnclusions and twisting
the words of the statute far beyond their $lain meaning and
purposes.

The District Court summarily upheld respondents1

actions without listing findings or reasons.

Appellant respect-

fully requests the Court of Appeals to review with scrutiny the
proceedings below, the statutes in question, the numerous
authorities cited above, etc., and reverse the orders entered
below for the reasons stated herein.
DATED this 5th day of February, 1988.

Respectfully submitted, ^

David H. Day
DAY & BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney^ for Petitioner
and AppeJLlant
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ADDENDUM

Order of September 18, 1987:
Order of the District Court for Salt Lake County, Judge Pat
B. Brian upholding the Final Order of Ithe Department ot
Business Regulation and the Securities Advisory Board.

Order of February 18, 1987:
Final Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc. pursuant to
§14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities,Act.

Order of October 28, 1986:
Recommended Order of J. Steven Eckluncfcl, Administrative Law
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities
Division seeking suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc.
stock.

Order of September 18, 1987:
Order of the District Court for Salt lake County, Judge Pat
B. Brian upholding the Final Order of the Department of
Business Regulation and the Securities Advisory Board.

DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN #2891
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
NICHOLAS E. HALES #4045
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5319

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

:

ORDER

)

In the Matter of the
Registration Statement of
AMENITY, INC.

:
)
:

Civil No. C87-2625
Judge Pat Brian

)

This matter was heard before this Court on September
17, 1987, at 8:00 a.m.

The Petitioner was Represented by David

H. Day while the Respondent was represented by Nicholas E. Hales,
Assistant Attorney General.

Both parties had previously filed

briefs with the Court outlining their positions.
The Court, after having heard oral argument, reviewed
the briefs on file, and examined the record from the
administrative proceedings, rules as follow^:

The Final Order of the Utah Security Advisory Board and
the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation
is upheld.
DATED this J$_ day of September, 19 87.

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge

-r/p^-ctUJ (XU^
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Order of February 13, 1987:
Final Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading
exemptions of the securities of Amenitty, Inc. pursuant to
§14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities'Act.

Utah Securities Division
Department of Business Regulation
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Post Office Box 45 80 2
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6600

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF
AMENITY, INC.

FINAL ORD|ER
CASE NO.

SD-86-11

This proceeding was initiated pursuant to a Petition,
dated June 5, 19 86.

A memorandum in support of a suspension or

trading exemptions was filed by the Division on July 15, 1986.
On August 12, 1986, Respondent filed a response to the Division's
memorandum.

The Division filed a reply memorandum on September

2, 1985. On September 25, 19 86, oral argument was heard before
the Administrative Law Judge, J. Steven Eckl|und.

Mr. Ecklund

issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended
order on October 28, 1986.
On January 8, 19 87, the Utah Securities Advisory Board
and William E. Dunn, Executive Director of the Department of
Business Regulation, after careful review of Mr. Ecklund's
recommencied order, issued an order adopting certain provisions of

Mr. Ecklundfs findings of fact and conclusions of lawf but
rejecting the recommended order.

The January 8th Order called a

hearing on January 20, 19 87f for the limited purpose ot receiving
evidence as to the intent of Capitol General Corporation and its
principals in their distribution of Amenity stock.

We

incorporate the January 8th Order herein by reference.
On January 21, at 3:00 p.m. the additional hearing was
held.

The hearing was held before the Utah Securities Advisory

Board with J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judgef
conducting the hearing.

Respondent Amenity, Inc. was represented

by David Day while Petitioner Utah Securities Division was
represented by Nicholas E. Halesf Assistant Attorney General.
The Utah Securities Advisory Board and William E. Dunn
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation
after careful consideration of all the evidence presented by both
parties at both hearings, and review of the briefs on file,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Final Order:

- 2 -

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Capital General Corporation has incorporated

approximately 30 other companies ("companies") and caused them to
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity,
2.

In June of 19 86, Amenity Inc. was acquired by Elkin

Weiss and Companies Inc. Two additional "companies" have also
been acquired.

They are Olympus Enterprises, now Florida Growth

Industries, Inc., and Y Travel, now H & B Carriers, Inc.
3.

Capital General Corporation wa& instrumental in the

acquisition of Amenity, Olympus, and Y Travel by the acquiring
companies.

Capitol General received $25,000.00 for the services

it performed.
4.

The distribution of Amenity stock was done with an

intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act and the registration provisions contained
therein.

- 3 -

Conclusions of Law
As was concluded in our January 8, 1987, Orderf as a
matter of law, the term "good faith gift" in the context in which
it is used, i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a
bona fide gift of securities given in "good faith"f i.e.f not
given with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act andf most relevant to the instant
case, the registration provisions contained therein.

We have

found that the distribution of Amenity stock was done with an
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act.

As such, we conclude that the

distribution of the gifted Amenity stock was not done in good
faith.
We have previously concluded that the gift distribution
of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.

The distribution of the Amenity stock is not

entitled to the good faith exclusion provided by the Act because
it was not done in good faith.

The Respondent has not

demonstrated the existence of any exemption or exception for the
Amenity distribution.
sought or granted.

No registration of the stock has been

We must conclude that the distribution ot

Amenity stock constituted the unregistered offer or sale of a
security in violation of the Act.
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ORDER

THEREFORE, pursuant to Section 14 (3() of the Utah
I

Uniform Securities Act, it is hereby ordered |that the use of all
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc.,
its affiliates and successors, be and are hereby suspended,

DATED this

•

'

<

^

/

/

/

-

!

H

day of February, 1^87.

^

Keith A. Cannon
Chairman,
Securities Advisory Board

William E. Dunn
Executive Director,
Department ot Business Regulation

Marga/et Wickens
Member^
S e c u r i t i e s Advisory Board

. V f - s ^ ••%:_..
:
V^-:
*
Kent Btirgen ^

Member
-~y \
Securities Advisory Board

Hardy
Member
Securities Advisory Board
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this ^-C^C- day of February. 1987. I
mailed, regular mail, postage-prepaid, a copy of the foregoing
Final Order to David H. Day. Day and Barney. 45 E. Vine St..
Murray. Utah 84107.
)
>

/
J
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Order of October 28, 1986:
Recommended Order of J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities
Division seeking suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc.
stock.

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the Registration Statement
of Amenity Inc.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND
RECOMMENDED ORDER
CiseNoSD-86-11

Appearances:
Nicholas E. Hales for the Division of Securities
David H. Day for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated June 5,1986 Thereafter
counsel for the respective parties agreed to submit the matter on memoranda On July 15,1986, the division filed a
memorandum in support of a suspension of trading exemptions regarding Respondent's securities On August 12
1^86, Respondent filed its responsive memorandum. A reply memorandum ^vas subsequently filed on September 2,
1986.
Oral argument was presented on September 25,1986 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the department. The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the pnemises, now enters the folio * ing
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1

Respondent was incorporated on January 7, 1986 in the State of Utah with a capitalization of

100,000,000 shares of stock at SO 001 par value per share. Respondent's incorporators and directors are Julie
Harmon, Cynthia Paskett, and Jen Pattersson.
2

On January 7,1986,1,000,000 shares of stock were issued by Respondent to Capital General

Corporauon for $2,000. Capital General Corporation is afinancialconsulting firm, whose officers and directors arc
David R. Yeaman, Ms. Paskett, and Ms. Pattersson. The monies paid for theistock represent Respondent's only
asset.

3.

As of the just-stated transaction, Capital General Corporation was the only shareholder of Respondent.

Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gave 100 shares of the stock it held to each of approximately 900 people.
Those who received the stock consist of various contacts, customers, former customers, and business associates of
Capital General Corporation.
4.

No consideration or payment for the securities thus transferred was solicited or accepted by Capital

General Corporation. Those who received the securities were not required to purchase anything, become a customer
of Capital General Corporation, or provide any consideration for the securities in question. Capital General
Corporation distributed the stock to reward past association and loyalty and to provide exposure of Capital General
Corporation's consulting business to various financial entities as the means of creating or maintaining good will.
5.

Capital General Corporation has previously capitalized three other subsidiaries, caused said subsidiaries

to become public, and thereafter sold them in mergers with other companies. Respondent's promoters intend to do
likewise respecting Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The division asserts that Capital General Corporation's distribution of the stock represents the sale of a
security within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) and that distribution of said securities without registration oi
the same constitutes the violation of Section 61-1-7, quoted below. The division urges that both the initial and
subsequent purchasers of a public offering are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure mandated through
registration requirements. Thus, the division contends that full compliance respecting both initial registration
requirements and secondary trading laws must exist and all that possible exemptions from registration requirement ..to future trading of Respondent's securities should be suspended.
In opposition thereto, Respondent asserts that the distribution of the securities constitutes a good faith gii i,
which is excluded from the definition of a sale of a security by reason of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). Respondent
contends that the creation or maintenance of good will is not sufficient consideration to conclude that value has
passed within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a). Respondent further asserts that registration requirements are
inapplicable as to the initial distribution of the securities which occurred, inasmuch as the donees of said distribution
invested nothing and, thus, do not fall within the class intended to be protected by the disclosure afforded through

registration requirements. Respondent conceeds that any subsequent public trading of the gifted securities is subject
to applicable secondary trading laws.
Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state Unless it is registered under
this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14.
Section 61-l-13(15)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include:
. . . every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security
for value.

"Offer" and "offer to sell" are deflneu in Section 61-l-13(15)(b) to include:

. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or soliciation of an offer to btky, a security or interest in a
security for value.

Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i) further provides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith gift".
Clearly, the previously-described transaction by Capital General Corporation represented a disposition of a
security for value within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) or (b). Despite Respondent's assertion that there is
insufficient consideration present to find that value passed to Capital General!Corporation from the donees of the
securities in question, the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital
General Corporation's business in various areas represents the value envisoned by the just-cited statutes. See
Blackburn vs. Ippolito. Fla.. 156 So. 2d 550 (1963); King et. al. vs. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co.. Okla. App., 585
P.2d 385 (1978).
Thus, the only remaining question is whether the disposition of the securities constituted a good faith gift
exempted from compliance with the registration requirements set forth in Section 61-1-7 by reason of the
applicability of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). The division asserts that the transfer of the securities from Capital General
Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoid registration requirements mandated by statute
and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". Concededly, the transfer of the
securities was made to a significant number of entities and the term "good fajth gift" is not defined by statute.
However, it has been stated that "there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a
matter of statutory interpretation." S.E.C. vs. Rawlston Purina Co. 346 U.S.i 19,127 (1953). Further, there is no

evidence that the disposition of the securities by Capital General Corporation was conditioned upon either action or
inaction of the donees of said securities and the mere fact that value passes upon disposition of a security is not such
as to necessarily conclude that a good faith gift has not been made.
A more considered review reveals that the recipients of the securities were mere donees, to whom the
protection afforded by compliance with registration requirements respecting financial disclosure as to the securities or
the issuer of the same is not relevant. Clearly, securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose. Payable Accounting Corp. vs. McKinlev, Utah. 667
P.2d 15 (1983V Nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances presented, Respondent correctly asserts that the
purpose generally served by compliance with registration requirements (i.e., protection of the investing public) has
no applicability as to the donees of the securities in the instant case.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the relief sought in the Petition, dated June 5,1986, be denied and
said Petition be dismissed, there being no proper basis to conclude that registration requirements mandated by
Section 61-1-7 are applicable to the disposition of the securities in question.
Dated this

Z<6^0^

day of October ,1986.

